University of Dayton Law Review
Volume 2

Number 2

Article 15

1977

Torts: Finding Negligence in Order to Compensate Crime Victims
Mary Beth Leibowitz
University of Dayton

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Leibowitz, Mary Beth (1977) "Torts: Finding Negligence in Order to Compensate Crime Victims," University
of Dayton Law Review: Vol. 2: No. 2, Article 15.
Available at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol2/iss2/15

This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at eCommons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in University of Dayton Law Review by an authorized editor of eCommons. For more information, please
contact mschlangen1@udayton.edu, ecommons@udayton.edu.

TORTS: Finding Negligence in Order to Compensate Crime Victims-Semler v. PsychiatricInstitute of Washington, D.C., 538 F.2d
121 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, sub nom. Folliardv. Semler, 97 S. Ct.
83 (1976).
I.

INTRODUCTION

Recently, much attention has been given to the indemnification
of crime victims.' It is traditional to seek such indemnification
through civil suits from the person or persons responsible for the
actions of the perpetrator.2 In Semler v. Psychiatric Institute of
Washington, D.C., 3 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit held that the mental hospital, the psychiatrist, and
the probation officer in charge of John Steven Gilreath were civilly
liable for the death of Natalia Semler, by failing to retain custody
over Gilreath until he was released by court order from the psychiatric institute to which he was confined. The court held that the order
created a duty to the public, which the defendants breached. The
court, however, did not hold that a violation of the order was itself
conclusive proof of negligence; rather, it held that proximate cause
must be related to a violation through reasonable foreseeability of
harm. In addition, the probation officer was found liable for breach
of a ministerial duty, and therefore no foreseeability was required,
according to the court. As a result, of these holdings several serious
inconsistencies are apparent, and the decision will have important
and adverse ramifications for the rights of defendants in future
crime victim compensation cases.
II.

FACTS

The plaintiff, Helen Semler, brought a wrongful death action
to recover damages for the death of her daughter, Natalia, killed by
John Steven Gilreath, a Virginia probationer who had been a patient of the Psychiatric Institute of Washington, D.C.' The original
defendants-the Institute and Dr. Wadeson, the psychiatrist-filed
a third party complaint against Paul Folliard, Gilreath's probation
officer, seeking indemnification or contribution.5
Gilreath had been indicted for abducting a young girl in October, 1971. Pending his trial, he entered the Institute for psychiatric
1. Articles on indemnification of crime victims include: 55 A.B.A.J. 159 (1969); Kutner,
Crime-Torts: Due Process of Compensation for Crime Victims, 41 NOTRE DAME LAw. 487
(1966).

2.

See W.

3.
4.
5.

538 F.2d 121 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Folliard v. Semler, 97 S.Ct. 83 (1976).
Hereinafter referred to as the Institute.
538 F.2d at 123.

PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS

Published by eCommons, 1977

348-49 (4th ed. 1971).

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:2

treatment. In August, 1972, Judge Plummer of the Fairfax County
Circuit Court in Fairfax, Virginia, after conferring with Dr. Wadeson, sentenced Gilreath to twenty years imprisonment on his guilty
plea, but suspended the sentence on condition that Gilreath be
confined to and treated at the Institute. Several times Dr. Wadeson
recommended Gilreath for weekend and holiday passes, which were
approved by Judge Plummer. Early in 1973, Judge Plummer authorized the probation officer, Paul Folliard, to grant weekend passes to Gilreath at the officer's discretion. In May, 1973, the judge
approved the transfer of Gilreath to day-care status, which required
Gilreath to spend days at the Institute, and permitted him to spend
weekends with his parents. The probation officer then gave Gilreath
several passes to investigate the possibilities of moving to Ohio, but
failed to seek the judge's approval. Assuming that the Ohio probation authorities would accept Gilreath, the doctor notified the probation officer that Gilreath had been discharged from the Institute.
The Ohio probation authorities refused to accept him, however, and
he returned to Virginia. On Gilreath's return he was placed on outpatient status and participated in a therapy group twice a week.
The probation officer knew of this arrangement, but did not report
it to the judge. Gilreath killed the plaintiff's daughter on October
29, 1973.
The district court,' sitting without a jury, awarded the plaintiff
$25,000 against the psychiatrist and the hospital, and required Officer Folliard to contribute one-half of the judgment. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

III.

ANALYSIS

Although victim compensation is an end beneficial to society,
the establishment of that end should take into consideration all the
ramifications that the means to that end will produce, and should,
therefore, be done in a clear and logical way. The Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals approached this case as one of first impression,
and proceeded to find the defendants liable through the use of general tort law principles: a finding of duty, a breach of that duty, and
a proximately caused injury.7 The first question that the court discussed was whether the defendants owed the public, including the
decedent, any duty.'
6. Jurisdiction in the federal courts rested on diversity of citizenship. 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(1970).
7. 538 F.2d at 124; Annot., 38 A.L.R.3d 699 (1971).
8. 538 F.2d at 124.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol2/iss2/15

19771

NOTE

The defendants argued that they owed a duty only to rehabilitate Gilreath by the court order. They contended that Virginia case
law requires a sentence to "be certain, definite, and consistent in
all its terms, and not ambiguous, and not open to any serious misapprehensions by those who execute it."' The order, they contended,
did not inform the defendants that they owed a duty to the public.
Also, several Virginia cases have explained the significance of court
orders which, like the one in Semler, gave suspended sentences,
probation, and psychiatric treatment.' 0 They explain that such orders are to provide a probationer with the opportunity to repent, to
reform, and to become rehabilitated. The court rejected these arguments, however, and stated that the factual situation surrounding
the order indicated that the order was designed to protect the public
from attack as well as to give Gilreath proper treatment. Thus, it
was the wording of the order" through which the court found a duty.
As support for its holding, the court cited the Restatement (Second)
of Torts section 319, which imposes a duty of reasonable care on
custodians."
The court, however, did not state that a violation of the wording
of the order was in itself conclusive proof of negligence. Instead, it
held that reasonable foreseeability of harm was necessary to provide
a connection between the court order and the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's loss. There seems to be inconsistency in this stance, because the court, while holding that foreseeability was necessary to
prove breach of duty and to demonstrate proximate cause, based its
9. Hudson v. Youell, 178 Va. 525, 533, 17 S.E.2d 403, 406 (1941); Petitioner's Brief for
Certiorari at 16-17, Folliard v. Semler, 44 U.S.L.W. 2439 (May 27, 1976).
10. Loving v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 924, 930, 147 S.E.2d 78, 83 (1966), rev'd on other
grounds, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Wilborn v. Saunders, 170 Va. 153, 160-61, 195 S.E. 723, 726 (1938);
Richardson v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 802, 809-10, 109 S.E. 460, 462 (1921).
11. The only court order ever entered in this case was entered on August 18, 1972, and
reads, in pertinent part:
[Ilt is Adjudged and Ordered that John Steven Gilreath do serve twenty (20) years
in the Penitentiary House of this Commonwealth, at hard labor; but in mitigation of
punishment, it appearing compatible with the public interest so to do, the Court does
now suspend the serving of said sentence, conditioned upon the Defendant's good
behavior and he shall be on active probation subject to the conditions set forth in P.B.
Form 2 - Revised 5-71 for a period of twenty (20) years and further conditioned that
the continued [sic]
to receive treatment at and remain confined in the Psychiatric
Institute until released by the Court.
Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 9, Folliard v. Semler, 44 U.S.L.W. 2439 (May 27, 1976).
For the District Court's opinion, see Petitioner's Brief at App. 14-16, Semler v. Psychiatric
Institute of Washington, D.C., 538 F.2d 121 (4th Cir. 1976).
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319 (1965) provides: "One who takes charge of a
third person whom he knows or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if
not controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third person to prevent
him from doing such harm."
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finding of foreseeability on dubious grounds. The determination
that the harm was clearly and convincingly foreseeable was based
on "expert psychiatric testimony.' 3 A standard of reasonable care,
however, is not judged by expert testimony but by a reasonable man
standard in the case of Officer Folliard, and by the standards of
other members of their profession in the community in the case of
the psychiatrist. Besides this "expert testimony," no other indication that it was reasonably foreseeable that the violation of the court
order would result in murder appeared in the holding. Thus, the
interpretation of the court order to find duty to the public and
proximate cause of injury, is difficult to reconcile with established
standards of due care and of foreseeability.
Perhaps because of the nature of the court order the decision
can be reconciled. The court order itself was held to impose a duty
of due care,' which is analogous to statutorily defined duties of care;
the difference is that the court order is created by judicial holding
whereas the statute goes through legislative scrutiny. They are sufficiently similar, however, to offer a comparison.
Courts generally deal with statutory duties in one of three ways.
Many courts follow the landmark decision of Martin v. Herzog, 5
which holds that although a statute defines the duty, proximate
cause must still be proven by the plaintiff when that duty is
breached. The case of Daggett v. Keshner" qualified Martin by
explaining that while negligence is conclusively shown by the statute's breach, a degree of proximate causal connection must still be
indicated, although the strength of that connection is not necessarily the same as that required in common law negligence." Other
courts have held that the existence of a statute shifted the burden
to the defendants to disprove proximate cause.18 Still other courts,
as in Whinery v. Southern Pacific Co.,'" have held that the breach
13. This expert testimony came from a Dr. Blinder, witness for the plaintiff, who conceded that he had never seen Gilreath, let alone examined him. Other psychiatrists, witnesses
for the defense, testified that the change in Gilreath's status was a normal and sound medical
judgment in light of his progress. Brief for Appellants at 7-9, Semler v. Psychiatric Institute
of Washington, D.C., 538 F.2d 121 (4th Cir. 1976) (note that "appellants" in this brief refers
to the Insitute and Dr. Wadeson).
14. 538 F.2d at 125.
15. 228 N.Y. 164, 126 N.E. 814 (1920). Martin held that the unexcused omission of
statutorily required signals, such as traveling at night without lights, is negligence in itself.
To say that such conduct is negligent, however, is not to say that it is always contributorily
negligent. A causal connection must still be shown.
16. 284 App. Div. 733, 134 N.Y.S.2d 524 (1954).
17. See 40 CORNELL L.Q. 810 (1955).
18. E.g., Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 3 Cal. 3d 756, 478 P.2d 465, 91 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1970).
19. 6 Cal. App. 3d 126, 85 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1970). This presumption may be rebutted,
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of statutory duty in and of itself establishes negligence and all that
it comports; that is, duty, breach, proximate cause, and resulting
injury. These treatments of a statutory duty may be compared to
the language of the Semler court in its treatment of the court order:
[T]he probation order imposed on the appellants the duty to protect
the public from assaults by Gilreath because this danger was
reasonably foreseeable when the order was entered. The breach of this
duty, followed by the foreseeable harm on which it was predicated,
in itself demonstrates proximate cause.?
This language would indicate that the court was treating the order
as the court had treated the statute in Whinery, and was saying that
the breach of the order in and of itself established negligence. If the
court had acknowledged that this was its intention, the holding
would have internal consistency.
Nevertheless, the court maintained that proximate cause must
be separately established and that the common law principles of
negligence were necessary to prove the case.2 ' It indicated that like
some statutory duty cases, proximate cause had to be proven. But,
the application of common law principles did not satisfy the required proof of proximate cause, because reasonable foreseeability
of harm was not present. The nature of the duty in Semler depended
largely on the reasonable foreseeability of harm, and that foreseeability was the required link between the duty and the proximate
cause. 2 If, then, due care had been exercised by the psychiatrist and
the hospital, as the court admitted by affirming the trial court's
finding of no malpractice, reasonably foreseeable risk of harm does
not follow. Therefore, neither proximate cause nor actionable negligence had been established. Thus, neither through the application
of statutory principles, nor common law principles can consistency
in Semler be found.
The same question of reasonable foreseeability and proximate
cause was raised in the court's treatment of Gilreath's probation
officer, Paul Folliard. Folliard was held liable for the same breach
of duty for which Dr. Wadeson and the Institute were held liable. 3
The court, however, had to surmount the additional hurdle of sovereign immunity for public officials, which it did by applying the
but if it
20.
21.
(1951).
22.
43 YALE
23.

is not, plaintiff has met his burden of proof.
538 F.2d at 126.
Id. at 124; Trimeyer v. Norfolk Tallow Co., 192 Va. 776, 780, 66 S.E.2d 441, 443
538 F.2d at 124. See Harper and Kime, The Duty to Control the Conduct of Another,
L.J. 886, 898 (1934).
538 F.2d at 127.

Published by eCommons, 1977

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:2

ministerial duty versus the discretionary duty test.24 The court held
that Folliard's failure concerned a ministerial act, that is, seeking
court approval, and therefore, he was not entitled to immunity. 5
While determining that Folliard's required duty was ministerial
may have been proper, the result is that a probation officer could
negligently make a recommendation for release and get a court order
without considering the mental condition of the probationer, yet not
be held liable because his act would be discretionary. The purpose
of asserting that, because of a technical breach of duty, Officer
Folliard should be personally liable, while for otherwise actionable
negligence he would be automatically immune, seems unjust and
unrealistic. Folliard should at least have been permitted to argue
that his negligence was not the proximate cause of the injury, or that
he could not have reasonably foreseen harm.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Although the court's purpose in trying to compensate crime
victims was laudable, that goal should have been accomplished
through clear reasoning. Inherent inconsistencies developed in the
Semler case, however, in that the court imposed on the defendants
a duty to the public, but failed to show breach of that duty by the
standard of reasonable care. Even analogizing statutory duty to the
duty imposed by the court order demonstrated inconsistent treatment by the court. With regard to the liability of the probation
officer, the application of ministerial duty to find liability denies a
defendant an opportunity to contest the finding of proximate cause
or the use of the standard by which it was found.
Perhaps Semler is an anomaly which future courts will distinguish on its unique facts. The case, however, has ramifications for
future situations, presenting hardships to doctors who will confine
patients beyond the necessary time because of red tape or fear that
negligence actions will be brought whenever a released patient acts
in an aberrant manner. Probation officers will be held back from
encouraging their charges to rejoin society because they may be held
personally liable for wrongly judging a person capable of release.
24. Id. As the court defined it, a ministerial duty is one which the officer must perform
in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal
authority (here the court order), without regard to, or the exercise of, his own judgment upon
the propriety of the act being done. A discretionary duty is one in which the officer must
exercise his own judgment.
25. Lawhorne v. Harlan, 214 Va. 405, 407, 200 S.E.2d 569, 571 (1973); see Bellamy v.
Gates, 214 Va. 314, 316-17, 200 S.E.2d 533, 535 (1973); Dovel v. Bertram, 184 Va. 19, 22, 34
S.E.2d 369, 370 (1945); 67 C.J.S. Officers §§ 112, 127 (1950).
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As in the Semler case, these considerations must be applied to
the general purpose of giving a suspended sentence, probation, and
psychiatric treatment by court order; that is, for the purpose of
providing the probationer with the opportunity to repent, to reform,
and to become rehabilitated. These purposes are impossible to
achieve if a probation officer is hampered in his discretion, or a
psychiatrist hampered in his treatment. The technical breach of a
court order should be punished by contempt proceedings,"8 but unless a gross abuse of discretion on the part of the defendants is
shown, they should not be held liable." Crime victim compensation
is indeed a worthy goal, but it should be determined by legislative
enactment, not by judicial interpretation of individual facts. As
precedent the Semler case will be used to sanction the gross discrepancies which will arise between the price of compensation to a victim and the price paid by society for adequate psychiatric treatment
and probationary supervision of the criminally mentally ill.
Mary Beth Leibowitz
26. 60 C.J.S. Motions and Orders § 67 (1969).
27. Garcetti and Suarez, The Liability of Psychiatric Hospitals for the Acts of Their
Patients, 124 AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 961, 966 (1968).
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